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Abstract 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the world imbalances have increased significantly 
with a large US current deficit facing Asian surpluses, mainly Chinese. 
Since 2007, a partial reduction of these imbalances has been obtained, 
largely thanks to production’s decreases, without large exchange rate 
adjustments. The Asian surpluses have remained important. The objective of 
this paper is to examine the exchange rate misalignments (ERM) of the 
main emerging countries in Asia and Latin America since the 1980s, so as 
to shed light on the 2000s by a long term analysis and compare with the 
industrialized countries’ case. Our results confirm that ERM have been 
reduced since the mid-2000s at the world level, but the dollar remained 
overvalued against the East Asian countries, except the yen. Chinese, Indian 
and Brazilian exchange rate policies have been much contrasted since the 
1980s. The Indian rupee has been more often overvalued while a more 
balance situation prevailed in Brazil only since the 2000s. The Latin 
American countries have faced wider and more dispersed ERM and current 
imbalances than East Asian countries. But Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
benefits now of undervalued currencies while Mexico is closer to 
equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the world imbalances have increased significantly with a large US 
current deficit facing Asian surpluses, mainly Chinese. These imbalances reflect internal 
disequilibrium in each area, mainly American households’ over-indebtedness and the 
declining US competitiveness on one hand, the insufficient Chinese households’ consumption 
on the other hand. These imbalances have been lasting, partly thanks to the financial 
liberalization which has facilitated their financing. The present financial crisis has been the 
consequence of these imbalances. Since 2007, a partial reduction of these imbalances has 
been obtained, largely thanks to production’s decreases, without large exchange rate 
adjustments. However, the Asian surpluses have remained important. 
 
Exchange rates misalignments have been studied in details in the literature using two main 
approaches: the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) and the Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER). They generally concluded that the dollar was overvalued 
and that the euro was undervalued during the first half of the 2000s. While these 
misalignments have been gradually reduced, the yuan remained undervalued since the second 
half of the 1990s. 
 
However less attention has been paid to emerging countries’ ERM where contrasted 
evolutions can be observed. In most of the Asian emerging countries large current surpluses 
have been observed after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. The oil producer countries have also 
benefited of important surpluses thanks to oil price’s increase. Many countries in Latin 
America and in Africa have, on the contrary, suffered of current deficits, although limited. 
These divergent evolutions between emerging countries reflect different choices relating to 
growth model and exchange rate regime. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the ERM of the main emerging countries in Asia and 
Latin America since the 1980s, so as to shed light on the 2000s by a long term analysis and 
compare with the case of industrialized countries.  
 
For this purpose, a FEER approach is implemented. The FEER is defined as the level of 
exchange rate which allows the economy to reach the internal and external equilibriums at the 
same time (Williamson, 1983). The internal equilibrium is defined as the full utilization of 
productive resources of one country without generating inflation pressures. The external 
equilibrium corresponds to a sustainable current account. 
 
In a first step, using a model of world trade, FEERs are estimated for the main currencies (the 
dollar, the euro, the yen, the yuan and the pound sterling). In a second step, FEERs can be 
estimated for each emerging country, using simple national models and linking the estimation 
of national FEERs to the multinational model’s results to get bilateral misalignments of each 
currency. 
 
Our results confirm that ERM have been reduced since the mid-2000s at the world level, but 
the dollar remained overvalued against the East Asian countries, except the yen. Chinese, 
Indian and Brazilian exchange rate policies have been much contrasted since the 1980s. The 
Indian rupee has been more often overvalued while a more balance situation prevailed in 
Brazil only since the 2000s. The Latin American countries have faced wider and more 
dispersed ERM and current imbalances than East Asian countries. But Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay benefits now of undervalued currencies while Mexico is closer to equilibrium. 
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This paper is organized as follow. A second section summarizes the theoretical and 
methodological background. A third section presents the multinational model and the national 
models used to estimate the FEERs. A fourth section gives estimates of the external and 
internal equilibriums but focuses mainly on external imbalances. A fifth section presents 
estimates of the FEER for the main currencies and for emerging currencies. A comparison is 
made with other estimations, especially with the BEER approach. A last section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical and methodological background 
 
By definition, ERM is defined as the gap, in percentage, between observed exchange rates 
and equilibrium exchange rates. Yet, various methodologies can be used to estimate 
equilibrium exchange rates. 
 
2.1. Equilibrium exchange rates methodologies 
 
The PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) is the oldest one and simplest methodology to estimate 
equilibrium exchange rates. In order to explain movements of equilibrium exchange rates, this 
simple approach only relies on the relative prices. It ignores, however, other structural factors 
and seems too schematic, even when completed by a Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
 
Beyond the PPP hypothesis, two main theories of equilibrium exchange rates can be 
distinguished: a) the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (Williamson, 1983) and its 
recent developments (Cline, 2008), b) the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate which is 
an econometric approach (Clark & MacDonald, 1998). The Natural Real Exchange Rate 
(NATREX) tries to give a theoretical basis with a dynamic analysis but is close to the BEER 
approach in practice (Stein & Allen, 1997). 
 
The BEER approach explains the exchange rate dynamic with some main variables (usually 
the net foreign assets, the terms of trade, the productivity and the oil prices) which influence 
the real exchange rate at long term. 
 
A long term equation is first estimated by a co-integration method and then, using an error 
correction model, a short term equation is estimated. The ERM are simply measured by the 
gap between the observed exchange rate and its long run value. This econometric approach is 
rather easy to manage and gives useful results. However, the theoretical basis can be regarded 
as underdeveloped. And the recent improvements have been mainly econometric and statistic.  
 
The FEER is defined as the exchange rate prevailing when the economy simultaneously 
reaches the external equilibrium (a sustainable current account determined by structural 
parameters) and the internal equilibrium (full utilization of the productive potential). This 
approach is based on a structural model which mainly describes foreign trade relations and 
relates explicitly movements of exchange rates to internal and external imbalances. It has the 
advantage of focusing directly on structural parameters of each country. It allows for the 
estimation of equilibrium exchange rates of the different partners in a coherent manner by 
using a multinational trade model, which is rarely assured in other approaches. Its limited 
linkages with the inter-temporal optimizing literature are often criticized but the FEER does 
not pretend to describe the modality of the return to the equilibrium. It searches only, for each 
period, to estimate the real misalignment induced by the internal and external imbalances in 
terms of comparative statics. 
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Despite the fact that each approach has its advantages and its drawbacks, we prefer the FEER 
approach because it is more explicitly articulated with the structural characteristics of each 
country and it ensures greater consistency of estimates across countries. 
 
2.2. The FEER approach and the SMIM 
 
We conduct a two-step analysis (Jeong et al., 2010) in order to estimate the ERM, first at the 
world level for the main currencies (the dollar, the euro, the yuan, the yen and the pound 
sterling), second at the level of each emerging country. 
 
First, for the main currencies, the methodology used is a synthesis of previous works on the 
FEER (Borowski & Couharde, 2003; Jeong & Mazier, 2003) and of the Symmetric Matrix 
Inversion Method (SMIM) recently proposed by Cline (2008). A multinational model 
describing the foreign trade of the main countries and of the Rest of the World is used to 
calculate the main currencies’ equilibrium exchange rates. It is well known that in an n-
country model there are only n-1 independent bilateral exchange rates, because the first 
country’s exchange rate (usually the dollar) is the numeraire against which the others are 
compared. Consequently, there is an overdetermination problem in the FEER approach, as 
there are more equations (current account targets) than unknowns (exchange rates). 
 
In this paper, we use the n
th
 country as a residual in order to solve the overdetermination 
problem and to ensure the consistency of the world trade in volume and in value. Exports and 
imports of the residual country are calculated as residual of the world trade equilibrium in 
constant and current prices. But the equilibrium exchange rate of the residual currency, 
consistent with those of the other currencies, cannot allow the residual country to reach its 
equilibrium current account. In that respect the residual country is ignored in the estimation of 
the equilibrium exchange rates of the other currencies. In practice, in earlier works, it was 
generally the Rest of the World which was the residual country. 
 
To avoid such an asymmetric approach and following the SMIM approach, the six countries 
(the United States, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, the Euro area and the Rest of the 
World) will be treated symmetrically by carrying out six sets of estimates with six 
multinational models where each country is treated successively as a residual. A simple 
average of the results could be obtained. However, there is a high degree of consistency in the 
alternative estimates of equilibrium exchange rates for any given country across the 5 
solutions in which the current account target of the country in question is included (designated 
OCI for own country included). Conversely, there is sometimes a great difference between the 
average value and the value obtained in the resolution where the country or area target is not 
included (designated OCE for one country excluded). Consequently, the solution adopted in 
this paper will be to use (as the estimate of the FEERs) the average of equilibrium exchange 
rates obtained from all the solutions, except the one for which the country in question is 
regarded as a residual (OCI). 
 
Secondly, for each emerging country, an equilibrium exchange rate will be estimated using a 
simple national model of foreign trade. The equilibrium exchange rate will be defined, as 
previously, as the exchange rate compatible with the internal and external equilibriums of 
each country. It has been shown that, for a relatively small country, a national model gives 
results very close to the ones obtained with a multinational model where the studied country 
would be explicitly described (Jeong & Mazier, 2003). 
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This methodology improves previous works at several levels. Compared with approaches 
which ignore one area (the Rest of the World in practice), our model gives a symmetric 
treatment of all the countries, like Cline’s SMIM, as each country is successively treated as 
residual. Compared with Williamson’s earlier works using large econometric models, we 
construct simpler model to manage. However, the foreign trade model takes fully account of 
the interdependencies among main economies, including the one treated as a residual, which 
ensures consistency of worldwide results. Another advantage of our approach is the case of 
small countries which can be simply linked to the world model’s results, as it will be 
explained more in detail. In this sense, our approach takes more consistently account of 
structural parameters of each economy and is more manageable than a model of thirty-five 
countries with a simple reduced equation between the current account and the real effective 
exchange rate for each country (Cline, 2008). Moreover, our model incorporates the effects of 
the foreign debt service and of the oil prices on the current account but they are treated as 
exogenous. 
 
Lastly, based on studies of the medium-term determinants of current accounts (Faruqee & 
Isard, 1998; Chinn & Prasad, 2003), the equilibrium current account are determined by 
estimating structural determinants of current account (the demographic features, the 
developmental stage, the public deficit, the net foreign assets, etc...) relying on panel 
regression techniques. It avoids using an ad hoc approach which is often used, but seems less 
well founded. Sensitivity tests are conducted in order to assess the sensitivity of the results to 
adopted targets (current account target, internal equilibrium) and to values of parameters 
(price-elasticities). 
 
3. Macroeconomic modeling 
 
3.1. The multinational model 
 
The model describes the trade structure of the main countries or areas, namely, the United 
States, Japan, China, the Euro area, the United Kingdom and the Rest of the World using 
standard foreign trade equations: export volume equation [1], import volume equation [4], 
export price equation [7] and import price equation [8]. Each country is successively treated 
as a residual and in that case export and import volumes are determined as residual of the 
equations of world trade equilibrium in value [5] and in volume [6] while their export and 
import prices are determined in the same manner as for other trading partners. We notice that 
this multinational specification gives a full account of interdependent effects in volume and 
prices of exports and imports of all countries. We incorporate a consumer prices equation [9] 
to take into account the feedback effect between the consumer prices and the import prices. 
The real effective exchange rate is defined relatively to the consumption prices. Finally, the 
current account is defined as in equation [11]. For the residual country, its current account can 
be calculated (equation [12]) but is not taken in account.  
 
With usual notations, the model is written as: 
 
Foreign trade volume equations 
 
Export volume equation 
 
 0
xi xi
i iiX X DM COMPX
   [1] 
 iji jj iDM M


  [2] 
 i i iCOMPX PMX PX  [3] 
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Import volume equation 
  0
mimi
i i i i iM M DI PD PM
  [4] 
 
With i = 1 ~ 5 {among Japan, China, the United States, the Euro area, the United Kingdom, 
the Rest of the World} = {all the countries except the residual one} 
 
 
World trade equilibrium in value and in volume 
 
Equilibrium in value 
 i i i i i ii iPX X E PM M E   [5] 
Equilibrium in volume 
 
i ii i
X M   [6] 
With i = 1  6 
 
 
Price equations 
 
Export price equation 
 1xi xii i iPX PMX P
   [7] 
  
ij
i i j jj i
PMX E PX E



  
Import price equation 
 1mi mii i iPM PMM PD
   [8] 
  
µij
i i j jj i
PMM E PX E


  
Consumer price equation 
 
 1ai aii i iPD PM P
  [9] 
 
Real effective exchange rates  
    
ij
i j j i ij i
R PD E PD E


 
    [10] 
With i = 1  6 
 
 
Current account 
 
Current account 
 i i i i i i pet peti i i iB PX X PM M E P M i E F     [11] 
 
5
1res ii
B B

   [12] 
 
With i = 1 ~ 5 {among Japan, China, the United States, the Euro area, the United Kingdom, 
the Rest of the World} = {all the countries except the residual one} 
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The multinational model variables are defined as follow: X, non-oil exports in volume; DM, 
world demand in volume; DI, internal demand in volume; COMPX, export prices 
competitiveness; PX, export prices; PMX, competitor export prices; M, non-oil imports in 
volume; PM, import prices; PMM, world import prices; PD, consumer prices; P, production 
prices; E, nominal bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar; R, real effective exchange 
rates; B, current account; i, interest rates for external debt; F, net external debt; Ppet, oil price; 
Mpet, net oil import. 
 
We notice that in the model the dollar plays the role of numeraire (E3 = 1) and the bilateral 
exchange rates of other currencies against the dollar are written as 1 dollar = E1 yens = E2 
yuans = E4 euros = E5 pounds = E6 monetary unities of the Rest of the World. 
 
In this framework, the FEERs are defined as the real effective exchange rates compatible with 
the simultaneous realization of the internal and external equilibriums at medium term of each 
trading partner. The internal equilibrium means that actual output follows the potential 
production and the external equilibrium means that actual current account corresponds to the 
sustainable current account at medium term. 
 
The model is written in logarithmic differential compared with the equilibrium, which directly 
calculates the extent of the misalignment. Variables in lower case correspond to the log 
differences of these variables, thus e = dLogE = dE/E = (E  Ee)/Ee for the bilateral exchange 
rate and x = dLogX = dX/X = (X  Xe)/Xe for other variables, except for current account b = 
(B/PY)  (B/PY)e where the variable b represents the difference between the observed current 
account and the equilibrium current account as a percentage of GDP. The values of bilateral 
ERM (e) are given by solving the model in logarithmic differential (appendix 1). 
 
On the whole, each multinational model comprises 35 endogenous variables (x, m, px, pm, pd 
for the six countries or areas and the five bilateral exchange rates e) for 35 equations (x, m, b 
for the five countries other than the residual one, px, pm, pd for the six countries and the two 
world trade equilibrium equations). The real effective exchange rates are calculated ex post 
using bilateral exchange rates and consumer prices. 
 
The production prices p are supposed to be at equilibrium, which means that we do not 
include a price-wage loop in our model. The two exogenous variables are the internal and the 
external equilibrium gap (di and b, respectively). 
 
In logarithmic differential form, the degree by which the economy deviates from its internal 
and external equilibrium determines the degree of misalignments of its currency. On the one 
hand, the degree of deviation of internal demand is measured by di = (DI  DIe)/DIe where 
DI
*
 is the equilibrium internal demand. This equilibrium internal demand is linked to the 
potential production. On the other hand, the gap between actual current account and 
equilibrium one, as a percentage of GDP, is given by b. This variable, which quantifies the 
deviation from the external equilibrium, is central in determining ERM.  
 
As mentioned before, each country is treated successively as residual, which gives six 
multinational models. The six countries are treated symmetrically, including the Rest of the 
World, and six sets of estimates are done successively with each multinational model. In each 
case it permits to calculate an “equilibrium exchange rate” of the residual currency (eres) 
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coherent with the equilibrium exchange rates of the five other countries, but not with its 
current account target. A simple average of the results could be obtained. But it is preferable 
to use (as an estimate of the equilibrium exchange rates) the average obtained for all the 
solutions, except the one for which the country in question is regarded as a residual (OCI).  
 
3.2. The national model 
 
For each emerging country, except China, it is possible to estimate an equilibrium exchange 
rate using a foreign trade model in which the world demand and world trade prices are 
exogenous. As explained above, it is not necessary for a relatively small country at the world 
scale to use a multinational model to estimate equilibrium exchange rates. The following 
equations specify the trade volume and price equations for a small country facing world 
economy. The equation [17] describes the formation of current account. 
 
With usual notations, the model is written as: 
 
    10 0* * *
xi xi xixi xi
i i i i i i i i iX X D E P PX X D R
      [13] 
  0 0
mimi mi mi mi
i i i i i i iM M DI P PM M DI R
      [14] 
  * 1
xi
xi xi
i i i i i iPX E P P R P

    [15] 
   1*
mi
mi mi
i i i i i iPM E P P R P

    [16] 
 i i i i i i pet peti i i iB PX X PM M E P M i E F     [17] 
  *i i i iR E P P  [18] 
    * * *
ij µij
i i j j i j jj i j i
P PX PX E PM PX E

 
      [19] 
 
With i = 1 ~ 12 {Korea, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico, Chili, Uruguay, Colombia} and j = 1  6 {Japan, China, the United States, the Euro 
area, the United Kingdom, the Rest of the World}
1
 
 
The national model variables are defined as follow: X, non-oil exports in volume; D
*
, world 
demand in volume; P
*
, world prices; PX, export prices; M, non-oil imports in volume; DI, 
internal demand in volume; PM, import prices; P, production prices; E, bilateral exchange 
rate against the dollar; R, real effective exchange rates; B, current balance; i, interest rates for 
external debt; F, net external debt; Ppet, oil price; Mpet, net oil import. 
 
Solving this simplified model in logarithmic differential (appendix 2) form gives r, 
misalignment in real effective terms r = dLogR = dR/R = (R  R*)/R*: 
 
 
   
  
1
1
*
i i i petxi xi i i i i
i
i i i i i i
b T m di x d
r
x x m m x m
    
     
     
  
     
  
 [20] 
                                                 
1
 The Rest of the World is calculated as in the multinational model. In addition, we remove the country for which 
we calculate the misalignment from the world trade flows in order to calculate the Rest of the World in the 
national model. The difference is negligible since the countries in the national model are small at the world level. 
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Where σpetx = EPpetMpet/PXX, ratio of net oil imports on non-oil exports and σx = iEF/PXX, 
ratio of foreign debt service on non-oil exports. 
 
The FEER approach focuses on the real effective exchange rates. However, the nominal 
bilateral exchange rate against the dollar of each currency can be more intelligible. By using 
the equation [18], we can find out e, the degree of misalignment in bilateral nominal term; the 
partner countries’ misalignments are given by the previous multinational model: 
 
  i i ij j jj ie r px e    [21] 
 
We can also compute the effective ERM based on consumer prices: 
 
      1i i i i ij j j ij j jj i j irc m r pd e px e            [22] 
 
 
3.3. Foreign trade elasticities 
 
Without doing original econometric work, trade equations are taken from existing estimations 
realized with specifications close to the standard model presented before. We use especially 
long-term elasticities. The main results are presented in appendix 3. Considering the 
uncertainty surrounding estimations, sensitivity tests to elasticity modifications are provided 
in appendix 4. The sensitivity to volume and price elasticities appears to be limited. 
 
4. External and internal equilibrium at medium term 
 
4.1. Estimation of equilibrium current account 
 
As current account equals the difference between domestic saving and investment, the current 
account equilibrium is examined from the perspective of the medium and long run 
determinants of saving and investment behaviors (Faruqee & Isard, 1998; Chinn & Prasad, 
2003). According to these authors, the main determinants of the current account at medium 
term are: the demographic characteristics, such as, the dependency ratios of dependent 
populations relative to the working age population, which is expected to exert a negative 
influence, with a higher dependency ratio leading to more spending; the net foreign asset, 
which is expected to have a positive effect, due to the capital income resulting from it; the 
government budget balance, with a public deficit having a negative effect on the current 
account, but this effect may be regarded as a simple accounting one
2
 which should not to be 
introduced. 
 
Finally, we introduce a short-term effect, the output gap, since a higher utilization of 
production capacity leads to a deterioration of the current account. Yet, this last variable will 
be eliminated in the simulation of the equilibrium current account. 
 
The equations of current account are estimated with panel data for 1980-2003 period and for 
two groups of countries. In a medium term perspective, we use non-overlapping four years 
average of annual data (Lee et al., 2008). 
                                                 
2
 There are other variables, such as the openness ratio, which plays negatively, a higher openness meaning a 
greater possibility of assuring the debt service in the future, or the relative real GDP per capita, which exerts a 
non linear influence according to stages of development. We tried these variables, but results were not 
significant enough. Moreover, relative GDP per capita is evaluated non stationary by most of tests. 
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The variables of equation [23] are defined as follows: CA, current account as % of GDP; 
ISNFA, initial stock of net foreign assets at the beginning of each period of 4 years as % of 
GDP; CDR, child dependency ratio, population under the age of 15 years as % of population 
aged 15 to 64; ODR, old dependency ratio, population over the age of 65 years as % of 
population aged 15 to 64; OG, output gap in % of the potential production. The sources of the 
different variables are presented in appendix 5.  
 
 0 1 2 3 4                 it i t it it it it itCA ISNFA CDR ODR OG                [23] 
 
One group is composed of 19 industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) and will be used 
for determining the current account targets of the United States, Japan, the Euro area, the 
United Kingdom and Korea.  
 
The other group, composed of 26 emerging economies (Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam), will be used for determining the current account target of 
China and other emerging countries. 
 
The results of unit root tests are presented in appendix 6. As it can be seen, we reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in all the series. 
 
For industrialized countries, the estimated coefficients of equation [23] are on the whole 
significant with the predicted signs (Table 1) in different specifications. The dependency 
ratios are not highly significant, although they are the best theoretically justified variables. 
Output gap turns out to have negative effects on current account. Country effects raise the 
determination ratio. On the whole the cross section specification with country fixed effects 
seems the most relevant and is adopted in order to calculate the equilibrium current account.  
 
Table 1. Determinants of the current account for industrialized countries 
 
 OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects Temporal Fixed Effects 
Constant 
6.69** 
(2.14) 
11.27*** 
(3.29) 
0.69 
(0.29) 
ISNFA 
0.06*** 
(10.87) 
0.02** 
(2.22) 
0.07*** 
(8.51) 
CDR 
-0.16** 
(-2.23) 
-0.26*** 
(-4.18) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
ODR 
-0.09 
(-1.32) 
-0.19** 
(-2.28) 
-0.03 
(-0.51) 
OG 
-0.31*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.47*** 
(-5.77) 
-0.51*** 
(-4.09) 
Adjusted R² 0.47 0.89 0.56 
(Source: authors’ estimates) 
(( ) = T statistics; *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%) 
(Coefficients robust to heteroskedasticity) 
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Results for emerging countries are less conclusive than those for industrial countries, as in the 
case of other empirical studies (Chinn & Prasad, 2003). The specification has been slightly 
modified  by using a single dependency ratio (DR) with both child and old population and 
introducing the oil products balance (OB) as increasing oil prices improve oil producers’ 
current accounts and deteriorate other emerging countries’ current accounts. As previously, 
the coefficients are on the whole significant with predicted signs in the different specifications 
(Table 2). Country effects raise the determination ratio. Like previously, the cross section 
specification with country fixed effects seems the most relevant and is adopted in order to 
calculate the equilibrium current account.  
 
Table 2. Determinants of current account for developing countries 
 
 OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects Temporal Fixed Effects 
Constant 
8.78*** 
(6.62) 
14.23*** 
(7.11) 
3.85*** 
(2.79) 
ISNFA 
0.07*** 
(9.88) 
0.06*** 
(6.20) 
0.07*** 
(11.90) 
DR 
-0.11*** 
(-5.45) 
-0.20*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.03 
(-1.60) 
OB 
0.21*** 
(6.35) 
0.22*** 
(2.65) 
0.19*** 
(6.27) 
OG 
-0.39** 
(-2.49) 
-0.37** 
(-2.49) 
-0.32* 
(-1.86) 
Adjusted R² 0.50 0.57 0.60 
(Source: authors’ estimates) 
(( ) = T statistics; *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%) 
(Coefficients robust to heteroskedasticity) 
 
4.2. The simulated equilibrium current balances 
 
For simulating equilibrium current balances, we use the value of initial stocks of net foreign 
asset at the beginning of each four years period’s and four years average values of 
dependency ratios and other variables, but we exclude output gap in order to remove short-
term effects. Figures 1 to 5 show the observed and equilibrium values of the current account 
for the main industrialized and emerging countries. 
 
A last correction should be specified. In the FEER theoretical framework, the whole 
difference between observed current balance and equilibrium one must not be interpreted 
entirely as an external disequilibrium. This difference is partly due to delayed effects of 
exchange rates variations that have not yet occurred entirely, but should be taking into 
account in the estimation. This correction is made using the dynamic structure of external 
trade equations. These figures show observed and adjusted current accounts with equilibrium 
ones. 
 
The US current account target is between -2 and -3% of GDP over the period. In several 
approaches on international imbalances, the target of -3% of GDP is selected for the U.S. 
current account deficit in the medium term (Ahearne et al., 2007). The simulated target for the 
current account deficit of the United States thus appears consistent with approaches that set 
the standard deficit on an ad hoc basis. The US current account has known contrasted periods 
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with large deficits, like in the middle of the 1980s and the 2000s, and more equilibrated 
positions at the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s (figure 1). 
 
The Euro area is in a very different situation. Since the mid-1990s, the Euro area’s 
equilibrium current account has been close to zero with a slight improvement over the early 
1980s, thanks to a growing external position. The amplitude of current imbalances in the Euro 
area (as a whole) is weak compared to those observed in other major world economies. 
However, this “balanced” situation in the Euro area masks a great heterogeneity for each Euro 
area’s member. 
 
Figure 1: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of the USA and the Euro area
3
 
 
  
(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
 
Figure 2: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of Japan and Korea 
 
  
(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
                                                 
3 The observed current account of the main trade partners have been corrected from the global discrepancy proportionately to 
theirs weights in the world trade (Source: CHELEM; World Economic Outlook, April 2010 (International Monetary Fund)). 
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Since the 1980s Japan has known huge current surpluses, far above its equilibrium value 
during the 1980s and 2000s. Actually this equilibrium current account balance has 
experienced contrasting trends. It has increased until the mid-1990s under the effect of its 
improving net external position due to surpluses’ accumulation. Then the Japanese 
equilibrium current account balance deteriorated due, mainly, to a sharp increase in the old 
dependency ratio (ODR) which reduced national savings since it increased the share of 
inactive with low saving ratio (figure 2). 
 
South Korea presents some similitude with the Japanese case with large current surpluses in 
the second half of the 1980s and after the Asian crisis of 1997. The equilibrium current 
account has increased a lot since the 1980s, from around -4% of GDP up to 1% in the 1990s, 
thanks to its increasing net external position and a moderate declining dependency ratio. 
During the 2000s the Korean current account remained close to its equilibrium value. 
 
The B(R)ICs, the most important emerging countries, are interesting to compare together 
because they have faced contrasted evolutions (figure 3). First, China had an equilibrium 
current account close to zero % of GDP during the 1980s and the first years of 1990s, which 
seems coherent with the policy adopted by Chinese authorities that wanted to avoid the resort 
to large external debt. The structural reforms, which started in 1979, have allowed a 
progressive openness to foreign trade while the productive sector was modernized. During the 
1990s the openness has accelerated with large inflows of foreign direct investments. Since the 
mid-1990s, the equilibrium current account has increased to reach 2% of GDP in 2008. In this 
evolution the improvement of net external position and the decreasing of the dependency ratio 
played a positive role. On the whole Chinese surpluses have become larger after the second 
half of the 1990s in spite of the impact of the Asian crisis after 1998. 
 
Second, in India economic reforms have been more limited than in China (Chauvin & 
Lemoine, 2005). However accelerated growth and increasing imports have induced large 
current deficits, which reflects a very different economic strategy compared with China. At 
the beginning of the 2000s, the improvement of the current account was mainly explained by 
a slowdown with decreasing imports and by rising agricultural prices of export goods. It 
didn’t last and the growth recovery combined with the increase of oil prices induced a new 
huge deficit after 2005. The current account equilibrium, largely negative during the 1980s, 
increased progressively to reach zero % of GDP at the middle of the 2000s, mainly thanks to 
the improvement of the net external position and of the dependency ratio. At the end of the 
2000s, the equilibrium current account decreased to -1% of GDP due to a degradation of the 
net external position. 
 
Third, Brazil is a last case as current deficits have been far larger than in China and India at 
the beginning of the 1980s (around -8% of GDP, before the debt crisis) and in the second half 
of the 1990s (-4% of GDP, after the success of the Plan Real and the large flow of foreign 
direct investments). The current account equilibrium was highly negative at the beginning of 
the 1980s (-5% of GDP), which reflected a growth strategy based on foreign debt, quite 
different from the Chinese and even Indian cases. But it increased regularly up to a level close 
to 0% in the 2000s, mainly thanks to the decline of the dependency ratio. 
 
The South East Asian countries present some similarities (figure 4). During the 1980s and 
especially during the 1990s before the financial crisis of 1997-1998, their current accounts 
have often been inferior to their equilibrium values which were close to 0% of GDP in 
Indonesia and Malaysia and negative, but increasing thanks to the decrease of the dependency 
ratios, in Thailand and Philippines. High rates of growth and the resort to foreign debt and 
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FDI can explain this configuration. After the Asian crisis and the large devaluations that 
followed, the East Asian countries have accumulated important current surpluses with the 
export booms. During the 2000s these surpluses have decreased, especially in Thailand and, 
to a less extent, in Indonesia. On the whole, the current accounts remained higher than the 
equilibrium values which were close to 0% of GDP. In Malaysia and Philippines the current 
surpluses were larger, but with increasing equilibrium values due the improvement of their net 
foreign positions, especially in Malaysia. 
 
The current account imbalances of Latin American countries are larger and more frequent 
than those observed in East Asia (figure 5). In Mexico and Colombia, after the debt crisis of 
1982 and the following devaluations, the current surpluses didn’t last. Deficits reappeared and 
remained during the 1990s and 2000s, largely under the current account equilibrium. These 
equilibrium values increased sharply from -5% at the beginning of the 1980s up to 0% at the 
end of the 2000s due to the decline of the dependency ratio and to the rising oil prices during 
the 2000s, especially in the Mexican case. 
 
Figure 3: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of China, India and Brazil 
 
  
 
(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
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Figure 4: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of South East Asian countries 
 
  
  
(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
 
Figure 5: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of Latin American countries 
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(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
 
Argentina is a case study. The 1980s were marked by chaotic evolutions with high inflation, 
recurrent depreciation, current deficits and a succession of stabilization plans which failed and 
led to the adoption of the currency board in 1991. During the 1990s current deficits enlarged 
up to -5% of GDP, well under the equilibrium value, until the crisis of 2002 and the end of the 
currency board. The production’s decline and large depreciation then induced a huge current 
surplus which declined after, but remained above the equilibrium value close to 0% of GDP in 
the 2000s. The increase of the current account equilibrium in Argentina since the 1980s has 
resulted of two opposite trends, a favorable evolution of the dependency ratio and the rising 
oil net exports on one hand, a deterioration of the net foreign assets on the other, which led to 
stabilization around 0% of GDP. 
 
The beginning of the 1980s was marked in Chile, like in many Latin American countries, by 
successive anti-inflation plans in a context of incertitude following the Mexican crisis of 
1982. Huge current deficits (around -10% of GDP) characterized that period but were 
progressively reduced in the middle of the 1980s when Chile recovered a steady and more 
sustainable growth. Except during the mess provoked by the Asian and Russian crisis in 
1997-1998, current account improved and led to increasing surpluses in the 2000s. The 
equilibrium current account appears in line with this trend, permanently negative but 
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increasing from -4% of GDP in 1980 to -2% in the 2000s. The decline of the dependency ratio 
and the improvement of the net foreign position explain this evolution. 
 
Uruguay’s current account presents some similitude with the Chilean case, although less 
favorable in the long run. Huge deficits at the beginning of the 1980s were followed by more 
balanced positions at the end of that decade and a deficit around -2% of GDP during the 
1990s and 2000s. The equilibrium current account improved slightly during the 1990s up to 
0% of GDP thanks to the positive impact of the net foreign assets and of the oil products 
balance. But it decreased during the 2000s down to -2% of GDP, due to rising dependency 
ratio, deterioration of the net exports of oil products and erosion of the net foreign position. 
 
4.3. The estimation of internal equilibrium 
 
The internal equilibrium is defined as the state of full utilization of productive resources, 
without inflation pressures. For sake of simplification, a restrictive approach, limited to the 
measure of the potential output, is adopted. This approach of internal equilibrium seems less 
suited for emerging countries like China or Brazil, where the concepts of potential output and 
full employment raise many problems, particularly because of the extent of regional 
imbalances and hidden underemployment in rural areas (Bouveret et al., 2006). This 
estimation of output gap is simply taken as representative of the degree of deviation of the 
internal demand (di). It must be regarded as a first step, which seems, however, sufficient at 
this stage. Indeed, as we shall see, results are only slightly sensitive to output gap’s estimates. 
 
Different methods can be employed in calculating potential production and the corresponding 
output gap. For industrialized countries, we take the values estimated with production 
function by the OECD
4
. This approach relies on estimated productions functions and a 
measure of the available productions factors in the country. It demands more information and 
more hypotheses regarding economic mechanisms than other simpler approaches, but is less 
mechanical and is theoretically more relevant. 
 
For developing countries, this kind of estimates is not available. So we calculate output gap 
by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter on real GDP over the period 1970-2013
5
. However, a 
study in depth on this issue found that output gaps of East Asian countries estimated by 
several methods are similar for the period 1975-2000 (Gerlach & Yiu, 2004). In addition, our 
sensitivity tests show that errors in output gap estimation do not disrupt the whole conclusion. 
In the case of China, an increase of 1% in output gap leads to less than 1% of undervaluation. 
 
5. Equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments 
 
Results will be presented in four steps, first the main OECD countries, the USA and  the Euro 
area for the western side, Japan and Korea for the Asian side, second the B(R)ICs as the main 
emerging countries, third the East Asian countries and last the Latin American ones. Although 
the methodology is basically the same, equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments are not 
estimated in the same way for all the countries.  
                                                 
4
 Economic Outlook, OECD, December 2008. 
5
 As it is known, this filter has certain disadvantages. It does not define well the output gap at the beginning and 
at the end of samples. It tends to neglect the structural breaks and the regime shifts. For prolonged slowdowns it 
deviates too much from a production function gap. We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a lower smoothing 
parameter than that of industrialized countries to take into account that the business cycle is shorter in emerging  
countries. 
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For the main economic partners (the U.S.A., the Euro area, the U.K., Japan, China and the 
Rest of the World), with the internal and external equilibrium previously estimated, the 
multinational model is used six times to produce misalignments in terms of real effective 
exchange rates r = dLogR = dR/R = (R  Re)/Re and nominal exchange rate against the dollar 
e = dLogE = dE/E = (E  Ee)/Ee, each country playing successively the role of residual 
country without its own current account target. The final solution is obtained by making an 
average of the 5 runs in which the current account target of each country is included 
(designated OCI for own country included). 
 
This allows determining undervaluations (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluations (e < 0 and r < 0) 
for the dollar, the euro, the yen, the yuan, the pound sterling and the Rest of the World’s 
currency over the period 1982-2009. In the following tables and figures results are not given 
for the pound sterling and the Rest of the World. 
 
For the other countries, Korea, India, Brazil, the other East Asian and Latin American 
countries, a simple national model is used for each country and linked to the results of the 
multinational model to obtain misalignments in terms of real effective exchange rates (using 
relative consumption prices) and nominal exchange rate against the dollar. 
 
For all the countries examined, the following tables give the under (over)valuation in real 
effective (r) and nominal bilateral terms (e) for the period 1982-2009. Figures show the 
evolution of the observed and equilibrium exchange rate over the period, in real effective and 
nominal bilateral against the dollar terms. 
 
5.1. Estimates of FEER for the main OECD countries 
 
In real effective terms, the dollar was undervalued at the beginning of the 1980s but this 
undervaluation declined and was replaced by an overvaluation in the middle of the 1980s 
while current deficit increased up to -3% of GDP. Conversely, after the sharp real 
depreciation of the dollar between 1985 and 1990, the current account improved and the 
dollar became undervalued (20% in 1990, less in the middle of the 1990s). Yet, this 
undervaluation decreased with the dollar’s real appreciation and the American currency 
became overvalued (11% in 2001). Since then, in spite of its real depreciation, the dollar 
appeared more and more overvalued (reaching 30% in 2005 and 2006). This reflected the 
growing American imbalances and the structural loss of American competitiveness which was 
illustrated by an even stronger real depreciation of the dollar’s equilibrium exchange rate. 
After the crisis erupted in 2007, the real overvaluation of the dollar has been reduced and 
might reach 8% in 2009 (table 3 and figure 6). 
 
The euro real effective exchange rate’s evolution is rather opposite to the dollar’s one but the 
euro’s misalignments appeared smaller than the dollar’s ones, which reflects more reduced 
imbalances of the Euro area as a whole. The euro was undervalued during the 1980s (between 
10-20% in real terms, slightly more against the dollar). This undervaluation remained, but 
declined with the sharp appreciation of the euro against the dollar from 1985 to 1990, while 
Euro area’s surplus disappeared. From the mid-1990s to 2000, the euro has depreciated in real 
effective terms but remained close to its equilibrium value, which depreciated also, reflecting 
the problems of European competitiveness during this period. Since 2000, the euro became 
undervalued in real terms (7% in 2001) in spite of its real appreciation, thanks to painful 
structural adjustments, mainly in Germany, which induced a real appreciation of the euro 
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equilibrium exchange rate. With ongoing real revaluation, the euro real undervaluation has 
declined and has been replaced from 2005 by a slight overvaluation. 
 
Table 3: Undervaluation (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluation (e < 0 and r < 0) for the 
United States, the Euro area, Japan and Korea (in %) 
 
 
e_eu e_jpn e_kor r_us r_eu r_jpn r_kor 
1982 2.8 -3.0 17.2 13.8 8.0 4.9 7.5 
1983 14.1 1.2 26.8 7.4 15.2 5.2 8.3 
1984 18.2 10.3 21.2 -3.9 12.2 5.5 3.6 
1985 27.4 18.9 8.1 -7.4 19.1 14.1 1.0 
1986 33.2 21.0 25.2 -7.8 21.0 11.0 10.6 
1987 21.6 17.3 25.4 -9.3 11.0 6.9 14.0 
1988 5.3 -2.0 16.0 5.3 9.5 1.9 14.0 
1989 5.1 -2.7 -7.8 9.6 11.7 4.1 -1.9 
1990 -3.4 0.2 -15.5 15.1 1.2 4.3 -9.0 
1991 -22.1 -4.9 -26.9 23.6 -10.6 6.1 -11.2 
1992 -23.6 -5.6 -23.9 19.2 -10.0 6.5 -7.7 
1993 -7.1 -8.8 -22.3 11.1 4.5 1.8 -5.5 
1994 -5.5 -2.5 -11.6 7.1 -3.4 -0.8 -12.3 
1995 -6.6 -10.6 -19.7 8.5 1.2 -3.4 -8.5 
1996 -5.6 -14.7 -29.9 3.7 4.2 -4.7 -18.6 
1997 -3.4 -10.2 -19.8 0.0 3.5 -2.7 -9.3 
1998 -6.7 -10.7 11.4 -1.5 0.6 -2.8 15.0 
1999 -3.8 -14.3 1.8 -4.3 2.0 -8.9 3.2 
2000 3.6 -2.1 -3.1 -13.0 0.1 -5.0 -5.9 
2001 11.8 2.3 -4.2 -11.0 6.8 -1.4 -5.9 
2002 15.2 9.7 0.7 -16.3 6.6 2.4 -5.5 
2003 15.1 15.9 6.7 -17.7 2.2 4.0 -2.7 
2004 22.5 23.3 22.6 -23.7 6.0 7.3 2.7 
2005 23.0 32.3 23.0 -31.0 0.1 8.8 -2.8 
2006 23.4 35.7 21.5 -32.6 -0.9 10.1 -5.7 
2007 11.1 26.9 15.6 -22.9 -3.4 10.8 -3.1 
2008 11.8 22.0 16.5 -23.6 -4.5 5.2 -2.4 
2009 7.2 6.4 19.5 -9.9 -2.0 -5.1 5.8 
2010 8.8 8.2 11.3 -11.0 -1.0 -3.8 -0.6 
(Source: authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
 
In nominal bilateral term against the dollar, the euro was overvalued from 1994 to 1998, 
although it has depreciated. This reflected the undervaluation of the dollar during the second 
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half of the 1990s. After 2000 the euro became undervalued against the dollar (22% from 2004 
to 2006) in spite of the dollar depreciation.  
 
This reflected the growing imbalances of the U.S. economy which have led to a depreciation 
of the equilibrium exchange rate of the dollar. Following the crisis, the undervaluation 
declined and the euro is close to its equilibrium value in 2009. But, as it has been shown 
(Jeong et al., 2010); this rather balanced situation of the euro covers huge intra-european 
imbalances in the 2000s.  
 
Figure 6: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the dollar and 
euro (2000 = 100) 
 
  
 
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
 
After a rather long period of undervaluation in real and nominal terms during the 1980s, the 
yen became slightly overvalued in real effective terms after the middle of the 1990s due to the 
strong yen revaluation against the dollar and to the progressive erosion of the Japanese model 
of production which had allowed a revaluation of the equilibrium value of the yen. During the 
2000s the yen became largely undervalued against the dollar, but also in real effective terms, 
thanks to the large real depreciation of the yen and to the stability of the yen-dollar parity. 
This contributed to the recovery of the Japanese economy with important current surpluses 
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during that period. This undervaluation has been reduced and disappeared after the burst of 
the crisis which induced a sharp revaluation of the yen. 
 
In Korea, a period of undervaluation of the won during the 1980s, linked to the export growth 
strategy, was followed by a rather marked overvaluation, both in nominal and real terms. But, 
at the opposite of the Japanese case, this occurred after a real depreciation during the first half 
of the 1980s and, then, a stable dollar-won parity. This overvaluation of the won has been 
regarded as one of the factors explaining the Korean crisis in 1997. The sharp devaluation of 
1998 led to a large undervaluation and current surpluses. However this didn’t last, as the won 
appreciated, both against the dollar and in real effective terms, especially against the other 
East Asian currencies. The current account remained in slight surplus, but generally under its 
equilibrium value during most of the 2000s, with a won overvalued in real terms. The 
undervaluation against the dollar was less pronounced than in Japan and the euro area. After 
the burst of the crisis in 2008 the evolution has been at the opposite of the Japanese case, with 
a sharp depreciation, both against the dollar and in real terms, which has allowed preserving a 
nominal undervaluation (table 3 and figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the yen and the 
won (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
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Last, the question of the gap between ex ante and ex post current account targets can be 
examined. In a previous methodology (Jeong & Mazier, 2003), the ex ante and ex post current 
account targets were equal for all the countries or areas of the world model, except for the 
Rest of the World since it was treated as a residual. In this article, we have treated 
symmetrically all the countries of the trade model (Rest of World included) like in Cline 
(2008). All the countries or areas are treated successively as a residual. In this new 
methodology, the ex ante and ex post current account targets are slightly different. But the 
average deviation remains inferior to 0.3 % of GDP (in absolute value) for the period 2004-
2009. 
 
5.2. Estimates of FEER for Brasil, India and China 
 
In China the beginning of the 1980s is difficult to interpret due to the mode of regulation of 
the external trade that prevailed at that time. However, the yuan seemed to be overvalued in 
the middle of the 1980s with a massive current account deficit. The introduction of an 
exchange rate determined in the swap centers led to a de facto devaluation that permitted to 
reverse this situation and yuan was even strongly undervalued in 1991 with a significant 
current surplus in a context of an economic slowdown. Continued devaluations and the 
increasing usage of the swap centers exchange rate allowed the actual exchange rate to keep 
up with the depreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate and to preserve undervaluation 
during most of the time in a context of degradation of the current account and of high 
inflation, so that in 1994, the year of the unification of the exchange rate system, the yuan was 
even undervalued in nominal and real terms. The second half of the 1990s, in particular since 
1997, marked a turning point. The economic boom and the return of current surplus illustrated 
the success of the trade openness policy of the past years. This explained the revaluation of 
the equilibrium exchange rate of the yuan during the second half of the 1990s, both in 
nominal and real terms, in sharp contrast with the previous period. The stabilization of the 
yuan against the dollar and even the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the 
yuan meant in fact a persistent undervaluation larger than before, both in nominal and real 
terms. This diagnostic could help to find an explanation of the resistance of the yuan facing 
the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 during which the yuan was already undervalued. However this 
undervaluation has been temporally reduced after the Asian crisis and the large devaluations 
of most of the East Asian competitors. After 2002 the undervaluation of the yuan has been 
amplified against the dollar, up to 47% in 2006. It has been reduced since then, but remained 
high in 2009 (around 22%). Although more moderate at the beginning of the 2000s, the 
undervaluation in real effective terms has increased in the second half (table 5 and figure 8). 
 
The evolution of the Indian rupee’s exchange rate presents some similarities with the yuan 
case: sharp devaluation until 1994 in real effective terms and until 2002 in bilateral terms 
against the dollar, then stabilization in nominal terms with appreciation in real effective terms. 
But, beyond these rather similar evolutions, the Indian exchange rate policy appears very 
different. During the devaluation period, undervaluation and overvaluation have alternated as 
in China, but with a tendency towards a more marked and durable overvaluation. Current 
account deficit has been permanent and larger in India than in China, with levels frequently 
under the equilibrium value. After the stabilization of the real exchange rate (1994) and of the 
bilateral one against the dollar (2002), the overvaluation in nominal and real terms has been 
the rule, except during the years 2001-2003. The opposition between Chinese and Indian 
exchange rate policies is striking since 2004, which has a strong impact on the growth model 
of the two countries. 
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Table 4: Undervaluation (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluation (e < 0 and r < 0) for China, 
India and Brazil (in %) 
 
 
e_chn e_ind e_bra r_chn r_ind r_bra 
1982 29.9 10.3 -28.1 33.7 2.9 -33.8 
1983 25.6 19.6 60.3 25.4 4.1 37.1 
1984 12.9 23.8 66.9 5.7 7.9 57.1 
1985 -42.6 -5.1 66.7 -48.7 -10.7 43.2 
1986 -1.1 -1.3 59.0 -15.2 -11.0 43.0 
1987 27.2 -5.1 64.2 13.0 -10.7 54.0 
1988 -12.3 -21.9 50.4 -8.2 -18.2 51.4 
1989 -26.0 -21.9 37.4 -18.6 -15.9 42.1 
1990 25.2 -22.4 15.9 27.3 -18.0 21.0 
1991 15.0 -0.6 9.7 24.9 10.6 25.5 
1992 -5.3 12.0 17.3 7.4 23.8 34.8 
1993 -33.7 13.8 -2.0 -21.0 27.0 13.3 
1994 17.3 25.1 7.2 18.6 19.9 4.1 
1995 -7.4 -3.2 -38.7 0.8 4.8 -27.5 
1996 -9.9 -4.1 -53.3 0.7 1.6 -44.6 
1997 7.1 2.2 -65.4 14.5 9.2 -51.9 
1998 7.4 -15.0 -76.4 16.0 -6.3 -61.9 
1999 1.8 3.5 -59.2 8.5 5.4 -52.4 
2000 8.8 -2.0 -44.4 6.1 -5.8 -45.8 
2001 5.2 13.7 -39.3 1.0 9.7 -39.6 
2002 16.4 30.6 -3.4 7.1 21.4 -10.8 
2003 23.0 29.1 13.0 8.4 17.6 2.0 
2004 25.1 15.4 25.7 7.1 -2.6 7.0 
2005 41.8 2.1 29.7 15.9 -21.3 5.1 
2006 47.4 14.7 31.1 19.2 -12.0 4.5 
2007 38.6 9.9 15.7 21.2 -8.1 0.3 
2008 34.5 -0.9 8.3 16.2 -17.2 -8.4 
2009 22.4 -3.8 5.0 10.8 -12.9 -5.1 
2010 23.8 -4.6 -7.5 11.4 -14.6 -17.6 
(Source: authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
 
Brazil has faced quite different issues. It began the period with an overvaluation inherited 
from the development scheme of the 1970s.  After the contagion process of the Mexican crisis 
of 1982 a succession of exchange rate adjustments occurred in the framework of orthodox 
programs negotiated with the IMF or heterodox packages adopted in spite of Washington 
institutions’ hostility. Combining crawling peg and, when necessary, maxi-devaluations, 
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Brazil maintained a large undervaluation, contributing to a current account close to 0% of 
GDP, far above the equilibrium value, while inflation was speeding up to hyperinflation. 
 
Figure 8: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the Chinese yuan, 
the Indian rupee and the Brazilian real (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
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The monetarist Collor Plan stopped this dynamic in March 1990 but, six months after, 
inflation resumed its race, leading to new transitory stabilization packages, including 
exchange rate adjustments. Consequently, until the adoption of the Real Plan in 1994, real and 
nominal exchange rates continued to be undervalued.  
 
With the adoption of the Real Plan, Brazil focused on price stabilization and gave up its 
priority for competitiveness, stressing on capital flows to balance current deficit. In spite of 
the success of the Plan and some adjustments of a target zone pegged on dollar, inertial 
inflation entailed increasing overvaluation in real and nominal terms  (-76% against the dollar 
in 1998). Such imbalances could not last. At the end of 1998 contagion of the Asian and 
Russian crises carried on a speculative attack against a Brazilian economy mined by 
macroeconomic imbalances. After a 50% devaluation and some adjustments allowed by the 
adoption of a floating regime, the real and nominal exchange rates returned progressively to a 
level close to the equilibrium one at the beginning of the 2000s, while current account became 
equilibrated. 
 
From 2002 to 2007 the real remained close to its equilibrium value in real terms and 
undervalued against the dollar, in spite of an appreciation trend. Current account surpluses 
were obtained thanks to rising raw materials’ prices, dynamic world demand and 
improvement in competitiveness (Salama, 2009). This favorable trend was reflected in an 
appreciation of the equilibrium value of the real, in accordance with the observed 
appreciation. 
 
With the world crisis, real appreciation and peg to the dollar became more difficult to sustain. 
Real overvaluation and current deficit reappeared, although limited by comparison with what 
has been observed in the past. However, at the end of the 2000s, Brazil, like India, is much 
more constrained by its exchange rate policy, in clear cut with China which uses 
undervaluation of the yuan at the expense of its competitors. 
 
5.3. Estimates of FEER for other East Asian currencies 
 
Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia present some similarities with respect to exchange rate 
policy during the 1980s. The early 1980s were marked by the end of economic boom with 
current account deficit and overvaluation. The peg to the dollar in the middle of the 1980s 
allowed a real depreciation and an improvement of their current account, leading to an 
undervaluation of their currencies between 1985 and 1988, especially in Philippines and to a 
less extent in Malaysia where the ringgit was close to its equilibrium value. A reversal took 
place at the end of the 1980s where economic recovery was related to the reappearance of 
important current deficits. The peg to the dollar led to large overvaluation in nominal terms, 
but less in real effective terms. Thailand was the most affected while the phenomenon was 
less marked in Philippines where the growth was more modest and current deficit more 
contained. The Malaysian ringgit remained as before close to equilibrium, as Malaysian 
economy was more trade open, which reduced misalignments’ amplitude (table 6 and figure 
9). 
 
In 1996, at the eve of the Asian crisis, with newly increasing current deficit in Thailand, the 
bath was overvalued (-13% in real terms, -28% against the dollar). The overvaluation was 
more limited in Philippines and even less marked in Malaysia. Except for Thailand where 
overvaluation appeared significant (although more modest than at the start of the 1990s), 
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overvaluation does not seem to have been the main cause of the crisis in these East Asian 
countries. The large devaluations following the crisis contributed to the reconstitution of 
important current surpluses in Thailand and Malaysia, but not durably in Philippines. The 
bath and, to a less extent, the ringgit became undervalued, but not the Philippine peso as 
Philippines faced more structural problems at that time. 
 
Table 5: Undervaluation (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluation (e < 0 and r < 0) for 
Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia (in %) 
 
 
e_tha e_mal e_phi e_indo r_tha r_mal r_phi r_indo 
1982 26.2 -32.7 -28.7 -44.9 15.6 -24.8 -30.2 -45.8 
1983 -27.2 -19.4 3.1 -49.8 -34.1 -22.5 -10.4 -57.1 
1984 -7.1 5.0 45.3 -1.6 -18.4 -7.6 25.1 -15.2 
1985 -9.3 -3.0 46.3 -16.8 -12.9 -6.6 34.7 -21.0 
1986 26.2 3.7 73.6 -37.3 12.5 -5.3 53.6 -42.7 
1987 6.1 15.5 38.0 -8.3 -0.3 5.5 26.2 -12.5 
1988 -16.4 1.9 22.2 -18.5 -9.5 2.6 19.8 -13.8 
1989 -24.3 -9.6 -9.6 -18.7 -12.9 -1.6 -3.3 -11.6 
1990 -50.3 -12.4 -23.9 -25.8 -30.2 -2.9 -15.2 -18.7 
1991 -47.7 -26.9 -8.2 -34.3 -22.1 -2.5 3.2 -18.4 
1992 -36.6 -21.7 -15.0 -22.3 -14.1 -0.7 -0.5 -7.1 
1993 -32.6 -22.0 -33.8 -18.5 -10.5 -0.6 -12.6 -2.8 
1994 -15.5 -8.9 -14.2 -2.1 -12.5 -3.6 -12.3 -5.1 
1995 -26.8 -17.8 -15.1 -16.5 -9.5 -0.4 -3.9 -6.6 
1996 -27.5 -8.1 -18.9 -9.0 -13.3 -0.6 -8.5 -2.7 
1997 -4.4 -8.6 -16.8 11.9 1.9 -0.6 -5.3 16.5 
1998 20.5 0.5 -1.1 28.3 17.9 1.3 3.8 27.6 
1999 16.9 6.9 -11.9 2.0 11.9 1.4 -6.1 3.8 
2000 13.8 7.5 -1.5 14.1 4.4 -1.2 -4.1 8.0 
2001 6.5 0.8 -3.4 20.6 0.8 -2.1 -4.5 14.6 
2002 10.4 6.2 3.0 20.1 0.5 -2.3 -3.5 11.0 
2003 16.9 14.4 8.4 22.9 2.7 -0.4 -1.7 11.7 
2004 23.1 23.8 20.5 19.5 1.1 -0.8 0.2 0.9 
2005 16.0 33.2 26.1 24.3 -5.7 -0.2 -1.0 -1.8 
2006 30.0 37.0 32.6 38.2 -0.4 0.5 1.9 8.5 
2007 34.6 29.9 28.4 32.2 7.0 1.7 5.5 11.1 
2008 24.8 34.5 23.8 25.8 1.5 4.4 2.6 4.9 
2009 28.8 20.2 25.0 25.7 10.5 3.5 9.8 12.2 
2010 16.4 16.6 19.0 26.7 2.8 2.0 5.2 12.8 
(Source: authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
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During the 2000s, in spite a general movement of appreciation, the East Asian currencies 
remained undervalued against the dollar (around 20-30 %), but less in real effective terms. 
However, compared with the Chinese yuan, they appeared far less undervalued, which 
induced a bias in the international competition among East Asian countries. Since the 
beginning of the crisis in 2007 the undervaluation has been preserved and even increased in 
real terms, thanks to the peg to the dollar. 
 
Figure 9: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the bath, the 
ringgit, the Philippine peso and the Indonesian rupee (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
 
Indonesia, as an oil-exporting country, presents some specificity. The counter-oil shock in 
1986 has degraded its current account, leading to overvaluation of its currency until the 
middle of the 1990s. At that time, with sustained growth and current account more under 
control, overvaluation became weak and did not seem to have played a large role in the crisis 
of 1997. However the currency the most affected by the crisis has been the Indonesian rupee, 
which might be explained more by political reasons and other economic imbalances than 
strictly monetary reasons. The devaluation of the Indonesian rupee was of the most important 
amplitude among the East Asian countries, in real and nominal terms. It resulted in a rather 
limited amelioration of the current account and in an undervaluation of the rupee which could 
be regarded as modest, compared with the amplitude of the shock. This result could reflect the 
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destructive effects of the crisis on the Indonesian productive system. The situation has been 
progressively normalized afterwards, the country taking advantage of the rising oil prices 
during the 2000s. The undervaluation of the Indonesian rupee (around 20-30% against the 
dollar) was in line with the other East Asian countries at the end of the 2000s, but slightly less 
pronounced in real terms. 
 
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
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stabilization package the government adopted the heterodox Austral plan in 1985 aimed to 
break inflation by a policy mix combining prices, wages and exchange rates freezing after a 
sharp devaluation. After a while, the loosening of this policy brought about a return of 
inflation and overvaluation, as the government delayed exchange rate adjustments to fight 
inflation. 
 
Table 6: Undervaluation (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluation (e < 0 and r < 0) for 
Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay (in %) 
 
 
e_arg e_mex e_chi e_col e_urg r_arg r_mex r_chi r_col r_urg 
1982 -44.3 32.8 -39.9 -30.2 -54.7 -49.2 22.9 -42.1 -34.7 -58.3 
1983 -31.0 75.4 2.5 -27.3 8.9 -49.2 52.2 -15.9 -43.6 -10.8 
1984 -35.2 63.8 -30.6 -4.8 8.4 -53.3 40.9 -43.3 -23.2 -10.9 
1985 8.2 41.2 -51.5 12.8 -1.3 0.9 31.5 -49.5 5.1 -7.8 
1986 -24.7 29.1 -5.5 62.9 36.8 -36.8 13.7 -16.6 44.9 20.2 
1987 -41.2 37.5 24.0 61.3 19.7 -46.3 27.1 13.3 48.9 10.4 
1988 11.8 1.6 22.3 53.4 21.8 14.3 4.1 20.6 51.0 21.8 
1989 47.8 -6.6 8.7 44.3 17.2 51.4 -0.2 11.7 45.9 20.7 
1990 53.2 -2.4 4.5 57.0 20.1 57.4 3.3 8.6 56.7 23.4 
1991 -8.5 -20.7 6.6 46.6 -3.5 8.3 -2.2 20.1 58.4 12.6 
1992 -63.7 -38.5 -2.6 49.0 -13.4 -41.6 -14.8 14.3 61.7 5.5 
1993 -74.4 -34.4 -31.9 -37.8 -28.4 -54.2 -15.0 -11.9 -18.6 -10.5 
1994 -69.2 -21.5 -2.5 -45.6 -17.7 -66.1 -19.9 -4.4 -42.4 -17.9 
1995 -36.8 -1.2 -0.6 -53.7 -22.1 -25.5 6.4 7.1 -38.5 -11.1 
1996 -38.4 -6.2 -16.3 -54.7 -16.2 -29.9 -0.6 -8.3 -42.9 -9.3 
1997 -62.2 -15.6 -23.2 -68.7 -17.1 -47.4 -4.6 -10.6 -51.8 -6.6 
1998 -75.9 -18.6 -30.4 -58.0 -18.9 -59.1 -6.4 -15.8 -41.9 -7.8 
1999 -72.6 -9.9 9.3 12.5 -23.7 -64.5 -6.0 8.7 12.8 -18.9 
2000 -38.7 -2.8 3.5 16.8 -22.6 -40.5 -6.6 -2.1 9.7 -24.6 
2001 -15.4 -6.3 0.5 -8.2 -26.2 -18.6 -8.6 -3.7 -11.3 -27.0 
2002 56.3 -2.0 7.0 -10.4 24.7 43.7 -8.4 -1.6 -16.5 13.0 
2003 40.8 4.4 8.7 0.2 6.2 26.7 -5.3 -2.1 -9.2 -4.1 
2004 23.7 13.1 37.0 7.4 19.4 4.8 -3.9 14.5 -9.1 0.9 
2005 37.2 18.8 40.9 7.8 29.2 11.0 -4.0 12.8 -14.1 4.0 
2006 45.6 24.8 62.1 10.0 20.5 16.4 -1.0 28.9 -13.6 -4.1 
2007 33.6 16.3 47.0 -10.2 27.0 14.6 0.1 24.2 -22.3 8.0 
2008 31.4 21.1 18.0 -3.5 4.2 11.4 -8.2 0.2 -17.9 -10.0 
2009 24.2 8.8 25.5 4.5 43.4 11.9 -1.2 12.0 -5.2 26.1 
2010 19.4 3.9 12.0 -26.3 27.2 7.2 -5.5 0.7 -33.0 13.4 
(Source: authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
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A succession of stabilization plans were then implemented with more accommodating 
exchange rate policy aimed to preserve competitiveness, which led to undervaluation of the 
peso and current surplus in 1988 and 1989. But accelerating inflation led the Menem 
government to experiment various packages before the adoption of a more radical program 
based on a currency board in 1991. This led to a sharp real appreciation, huge current deficit 
and large overvaluation between 1992 and the burst of the crisis in 2001. The end of the 
currency board and the maxi-devaluation induced a strong reversal with durable 
undervaluation in nominal terms against the dollar (around 30%) during the 2000s and, to a 
less extent, in real effective terms (from 40% down to 5% and up to around 15%) with large 
current surplus in a favorable context of rising oil and commodities prices. Consequently, 
Argentina faced the last crisis in a better position with an undervalued peso and rising current 
surplus in spite of a moderate appreciation in real and nominal terms. However the real 
undervaluation may be overestimated in the last years, as the official statistics of prices used 
to evaluate real exchange rates are known as underestimating the actual rate of inflation (table 
7 and figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the Argentine 
and the Mexican pesos (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
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Figure 11: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates for Chile, 
Colombia and Uruguay (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
 
Although large, the amplitude of exchange rate’s evolutions is more limited in Mexico than in 
Argentina. The debt crisis originated in Mexico in 1982 led to an inflationary cycle with price 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Chile
Actual real effective exchange rate
Equilibrium real effective exchange rate
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Chile
Actual bilateral exchange rate against the dollar 
Equilibrium bilateral exchange rate against the dollar 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Colombia
Actual real effective exchange rate
Equilibrium real effective exchange rate
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Colombia  
Actual bilateral exchange rate against the dollar 
Equilibrium bilateral exchange rate against the dollar 
0
50
100
150
200
250
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Uruguay
Actual real effective exchange rate
Equilibrium real effective exchange rate
0
50
100
150
200
250
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Uruguay  
Actual bilateral exchange rate against the dollar 
Equilibrium bilateral exchange rate against the dollar 
31 
explosion and strong exchange rate depreciation. Successive failure of stabilization plans 
entailed a dramatic chase between price hikes and exchange rate adjustments allowing 
however a steady undervaluation, both in nominal and real terms with current surplus far 
above the equilibrium value.  
 
 
The heterodox Pact for economic solidarity of December 1987 combined fiscal adjustment, a 
fixed exchange rate (followed by some slight depreciations), a temporary freeze of wages and 
prices and strong trade liberalization. The program succeeded in stopping inflation, but 
residual inflation entailed a strong real appreciation and growing current deficits (-6% of GDP 
between 1992 and 1994), favored by trade liberalization. An increasing overvaluation 
appeared, both in nominal and real terms.  
 
Until 1992 external imbalances were regarded as sustainable, thanks to capital flows, 
following the Brady plan of 1989, and privatizations. But, in spite of important FDI, a large 
part of these capital flows were portfolio investment flows more reversible. Successive 
speculative attacks (the Tequila crisis in 1995) led to the abandon of the target zone exchange 
rate regime for floating with a large devaluation nominal and real and a dramatic slump. The 
current balance improved strongly and exchange rate became close to its equilibrium value. 
The large financial mobilization of IMF and the USA during the collapse and a successful 
stabilization package helped Mexican economy to recover external credibility and growth. 
But Mexico was touched indirectly by the Asian and Russian crises in 1997-1998 which led 
the government to devaluate by steps. In spite of this, the peso appreciated in real terms and 
became slightly overvalued in real terms and against the dollar until 2002.  
 
After a new depreciation against the dollar, the peso remained stable in real terms and close to 
equilibrium, with a progressive improvement of the current account. In 2008 the world crisis 
and the fall of the trade with the USA led to a new decline of the current account and a limited 
overvaluation. The Mexican economy seems in a more balanced situation to face the present 
crisis than in previous periods but its exchange rate policy is more constrained than in other 
emerging countries. 
 
Chile inherited of an imbalanced situation at the beginning of the 1980s with inflation and 
growing current deficit (-15% of GDP in 1981). In spite of a sharp devaluation in 1981 the 
inversion of the capital inflows led to the adoption of floating exchange rate. Large nominal 
and real depreciations followed, but important overvaluation remained until 1987 with 
progressively improving current account. From the end of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s a 
more balanced situation prevailed with stabilized nominal exchange rate, moderate real 
appreciation, limited current deficit and a currency often undervalued in real terms. The Asian 
and Russian crises were destabilizing factors with new imbalances and overvaluations. 
However nominal and real depreciations up to 2003 helped to recover equilibrium exchange 
rates and to improve current account. Since then, the Chilean economy enjoyed a rather 
steady and sustainable growth with growing current surplus (5% of GDP in 2006-2007), a 
currency appreciating in nominal and real terms while keeping large undervaluation. 
Although negatively affected by the world crisis of 2008, Chile faced it in a rather balanced 
position in spite of its reduced room for manoeuvre (table 7 and figure 11). 
 
Colombia presents some similarity with Chile in terms of exchange rate profile, a long 
nominal depreciation up to 2002, a real depreciation during the 1980s followed by a more 
stabilized evolution with alternative periods of appreciation and depreciation. But imbalances 
have been far more important with current deficits and overvaluation at the beginning of 
1980s, a long period of huge surpluses (4% of GDP in 1991) and massive undervaluation 
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(around 40- 60% in nominal and real terms) up to 1992. Since then, current deficits and large 
overvaluation have been the rule, except a brief improvement in 1999-2000. The Columbian 
economy faced the world crisis of 2008 in a more fragile and unbalanced position. 
 
Uruguay’s exchange rate evolution has, due to close relations, some similarities with the 
Argentine case in real terms, but not in nominal term, as a long nominal depreciation is 
observed until 2003, followed by an appreciation like in Chile and Colombia. The beginning 
of the 1980s was characterized by large imbalances, overvaluation in real terms and important 
real depreciation which led, at the end of the decade, to a more favorable situation with 
current surplus, stabilized real exchange rate and undervaluation. But, after a sharp real 
appreciation at the beginning of the 1990s, current imbalances reappeared with a long period 
of nominal and real overvaluation during the whole decade. Thanks to a large nominal and 
real devaluation in 2003 followed by an appreciation, a more balanced configuration has been 
observed during the 2000s with a real exchange rate close to its equilibrium value and an 
undervaluation against the dollar. However constraints have been reinforced facing the crisis 
since 2008.  
 
6. Comparison between FEER and BEER approaches 
 
6.1. Methodological considerations 
 
The BEER approach is widely used to estimate ERM at the world level. Some authors have 
compared the BEER and FEER approaches in the same theoretical framework (see e.g. Driver 
and Westaway, 2004, Benassy-Quéré et al., 2009). Despite of conceptual differences, these 
two approaches can be seen as complements rather than substitutes. 
 
More precisely, the FEER is a medium run concept. This exchange rate allows the economy 
to reach internal and external equilibrium at the same period. The essential point is “how to 
define the equilibrium”. We can distinguish three time horizons (short run, medium run and 
long run). An equilibrium exchange rate is associated with each time horizon. These different 
measures of the equilibrium may be not equal. The FEER concept can be seen as a medium 
term equilibrium in which the equilibrium current account is at a level compatible with an 
eventual convergence to the stock-flow equilibrium (Driver and Westaway, 2004).  
 
In addition, the BEER is a long run concept. When a country accumulates current account 
surplus; its net external position increases in percent of GDP. To stabilize its net external 
position in percent of GDP, its currency must appreciate above its equilibrium value and, 
thus, appears overvalued. In the long run, the current account is equal to zero and the growth 
rate of the net foreign asset in percent of GDP is equal to zero. This long term equilibrium 
corresponds to the stock-flow equilibrium for all the agents of the economy. This long term 
equilibrium may be reached, but it may take years or decades (Driver and Westaway, 2004). 
 
In terms of international monetary cooperation, the most relevant approach seems to be the 
FEER because it focuses on current account imbalances at medium term. In this context, the 
BEER seems to be less relevant because of its time horizon. Actually, assets stocks are not 
stabilized at medium term
6
 in percent of GDP, as the evolution of net foreign assets in 
industrialized and developing countries confirms it. However a comparison of BEER 
                                                 
6
 This statement remains true even in the case where the medium term is defined as a period of five or ten years. 
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estimations with our own FEER estimations gives some interesting lighting. A comparison is 
also made with Cline OCI’s estimates (appendix 7). 
 
6.2. Comparison between FEER and BEER estimations 
 
Figure 12 compares FEERs and BEERs’ misalignments for the main industrialized and 
emerging countries. At first glance, except for two main countries, India and Brazil, and some 
specific periods, the two approaches’ misalignments present large similarities. On the whole, 
BEERs’ misalignments are more important than FEERs’ ones, which is consistent with the 
long term equilibrium nature of the BEER. 
 
This first diagnosis can be précised by two indicators, the absolute average deviation (equal to 
the average difference between FEERs and BEERs) and the correlation coefficient between 
misalignments given by both approaches. The absolute average deviation is equal to 16% for 
all the countries, but is smaller for two third of them. Similarly, the correlation coefficient is 
above 0.5 for two third of the countries (table 7). The FEER and BEER give more divergent 
estimations for the three main emerging countries, China, Brazil and India, but are more 
convergent for industrialized countries and also for Mexico, Chile, Malaysia and Indonesia.    
 
Table 7: FEER and BEER matrix  
 
  Absolute average deviation 
  Below Average Above Average 
Correlation 
Above 50 % 
USA, Euro area, Japan, Mexico, 
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Chile  
Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay 
Below 50 % UK, Philippines, Thailand  China, Brazil, India  
 
For a better understanding of the FEER and BEER divergence, it can be recalled that the 
BEER is rather stable in the long run and, consequently, BEERs’ misalignments are mainly 
deviations between real exchange rates and an average value. Generally, real appreciation 
above this mean value led to overvaluation and, inversely, real depreciation led to 
undervaluation. On the opposite, the FEER is linked to a rather stable current account 
balance. FEERs’ misalignments reflect mainly deviations between observed and equilibrium 
current balance. Generally, a rising current account above the equilibrium value led to 
undervaluation and, inversely, a decreasing current account led to overvaluation. As a 
consequence, FEER and BEER misalignments are consistent when real exchange rate and 
current account are closely connected. As an illustration, we calculate the linear correlation 
coefficient between current account and real effective exchange rate. When the correlation is 
strong, the misalignments computed by the FEERs and BEERs follow the same path. 
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Figure 12: BEERs and FEERs’ misalignments in percent7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
                                                 
7
 The BEER results are extracted from a previous work on equilibrium exchange rates of Asian countries (Lopez 
and Mignon, 2009). 
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For industrialized countries, the correlation between current account and real effective 
exchange rate (appendix 8) is disconnected during some periods. Without these periods, we 
find strong correlations (for example, 83 % for the United States before 2003 and 72 % for 
Japan after 1984). For developing countries, we find also strong correlation (above 50 %) for 
all the countries, except for Brazil (32 %), India (49 %), Uruguay (39 %) and the Philippines 
(42 %). Like in industrialized countries, there are some periods during which these two 
variables seem to be disconnected (shade areas on figure 12). In these periods misalignments 
calculated by FEERs and BEERs follow different trends. 
 
These questions can be examined more in detail for some countries. First, in Brazil the 
divergence between FEER and BEER is especially striking.  With the FEER approach the 
Brazilian currency appeared undervalued between 1983 and 1994 in coherence with current 
balance close to 0% of GDP, but largely above the equilibrium value. The BEER gives on the 
opposite a strong overvaluation between 1987 and 1994 due to the sharp real appreciation 
observed from 1987 to 1990, but which didn’t seem to have an impact on the current balance. 
This could be linked to structural improvement of the Brazilian economy during that period 
which has been reflected in the real appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
On the opposite during the period 1995-2002 the FEER gives an increasing overvaluation 
following the Real Plan, consistent with huge current deficits. On the contrary the BEER 
gives an increasing undervaluation, especially after 1998, due simply to the real depreciation. 
Here again, this depreciation seemed to have only a positive impact with a very long delay 
due to the effects of the liberalization policy and the recourse to foreign capitals. These 
evolutions would be reflected in the real depreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
Second, India is another case of large de-connection between FEER and BEER. The BEER 
opposes two much contrasted periods, one from 1982 to 1990 with an overvalued rupee, the 
second from 1991 to 2007 with an undervalued rupee. This is simply linked to the large real 
depreciation which happened from 1988 to 1994 and was followed by stabilization. These two 
phases of over and undervaluation according to the BEER seems rather unrealistic as they are 
little connected with the large fluctuations of the current balance during these periods. 
 
Third, China is a last case with some similarities with the Indian case regarding the diagnosis 
of the BEER. According to the BEER the yuan would have been overvalued from 1982 to 
1990 in real terms and this overvaluation would have decreased and be replaced after 1992 by 
a large and permanent undervaluation, thanks to the real depreciation operated during the 
transition period. This diagnosis doesn’t seem coherent with the alternation of periods of 
current surplus and deficits during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Similarly, the 
steady and strong undervaluation doesn’t reflect the contrasted evolution of the current 
balance from the 1990s to the 2000s, notably with the consequences of the Asian crisis and 
the rising surplus in the last part of the 2000s. 
 
In summary, for these three main emerging countries, the BEER approach gives a too 
simplified view of the equilibrium exchange rate, based, to make short, on a simple mean 
value, which doesn’t integrate sufficiently structural changes that occurred. These structural 
changes are more taken in account by the FEER approach, although indirectly, which, for this 
reason, seems more appropriate. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Some general lessons can be drawn from this estimation of ERM and current account 
imbalances since the 1980s. 
 
The dollar’s misalignments in real effective terms have been the most marked during the 
2000s among industrialized and emerging countries. They reflected the increasing imbalances 
of the US growth regime (over-indebtedness of households and declining competitiveness 
facing, mainly, China), illustrated by the depreciation of the dollar’s equilibrium exchange 
rate. These misalignments were larger than during the middle of the 1980s when a first 
depreciation of the dollar’s equilibrium exchange rate had been already observed, mainly due 
at that time to the penetration of Japanese products. They have been reduced since the burst of 
the crisis in 2007 through the fall of activity and imports which has induced a shrink of the 
US current deficit. 
 
On the contrary, the euro’s misalignments in real effective terms have been more limited 
during the 2000s, thanks to the euro’s equilibrium exchange rate real appreciation. This 
appreciation reflected, mainly, the renewal of the German competitiveness after painful 
adjustments and restructuring at the expense of the rest of the European Union, for a large 
part. These limited euro’s misalignments recover actually huge intra-European imbalances 
with a euro undervalued for Germany and overvalued for Southern European countries. 
However, during the first part of the 2000s, the euro was clearly undervalued against the 
dollar, but to a less extent than Asian currencies like the yen and the yuan, which meant an 
overvaluation of the euro against these currencies. This undervaluation of the euro against the 
dollar has been progressively reduced until 2009 thanks to the appreciation of the euro and the 
effects of the crisis. It can be noticed that the euro’s misalignments were more pronounced in 
the middle of the 1980s, both in real and nominal terms, in spite of the euro’s appreciation 
and due to the appreciation of the euro’s equilibrium exchange rate against the dollar. At that 
time the US deficits were more reflected in European (German) surplus and less in Asian 
surplus, as to day. 
 
Japan has contributed to increase world imbalances during the 2000s with a yen undervalued 
in real effective terms and even more in nominal term against the dollar, in spite of the 
stability of the dollar-yen parity. The yen’s real depreciation has been sharper than the 
depreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate induced by the erosion of the Japanese model of 
production. It has helped to sustain the economic recovery at the expense of the rest of the 
world. This strategy of a yen undervalued had been used in the past from the 1970s to the 
begin of the 1990s to boost the Japanese growth, but at that time the yen appreciated in real 
and nominal terms thanks to the strength of the Japanese growth model. The 1990s had been a 
kind of exception with a yen overvalued. Since the burst of the crisis in 2007 the yen has 
appreciated strongly, the undervaluation has disappeared and the current surplus has been 
reduced. However this contribution to the reduction of the current imbalances has reinforced 
the constraints of the Japanese economy. 
 
Among the BRICs, the main emerging countries, the exchange rate policy has been 
contrasted. The Chinese case is the most well known. From the 1980s to 1994 the trade 
openness strategy has been based on a Yuan’s depreciation in real and nominal terms with 
alternatively periods of under and overvaluation, but preserving more undervaluation and 
avoiding the recourse to external indebtedness. Since the middle of the 1990s a turning point 
has appeared with a permanent yuan undervaluation in real and nominal terms, due to a real 
39 
revaluation of the yuan smaller than the equilibrium exchange rate’s revaluation which 
resulted from the success of the Chinese strategy of openness. This undervaluation has been 
temporally attenuated with the consequences of the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, but it has 
amplified since 2002 and remained after the financial crisis of 2007. Chinese surpluses are 
one of the symptoms of the persistent world imbalances. 
 
India has followed a different path, although there are similarities with China in the exchange 
rate’s evolution: long period of real and nominal depreciations, followed at the end of the 
1990s by a real appreciation and a nominal stabilization. But, during the depreciation period 
the duration of overvaluation has been longer than in China, with current imbalances more 
pronounced. After the stabilization the overvaluation has been almost the rule, with persistent 
current deficits, except for a short period between 2001 and 2003. India didn’t enjoy a 
revaluation of its equilibrium exchange rate as China did, which can be interpreted as a less 
successful policy of liberalization and trade openness. Since the burst of the crisis of 2008 the 
rupee’s overvaluation and current imbalances have amplified, which is rather scarce among 
emerging countries. It means huge overvaluation against the other Asian partners and put 
constraints on the future potential growth of India. 
 
Brazil is a last case where three different periods can be distinguished. From the beginning of 
the 1980s to the adoption of the Real plan in 1994, a succession of stabilization programs and 
exchange rate adjustments tried to preserve competitiveness through permanent real and 
nominal undervaluation, but with inflation hardly under control. From 1994 to 2002 more 
focus was put on inflation stabilization and less on competitiveness, as foreign capital flows 
financed current deficits. Real and nominal overvaluation was permanent, but gradually 
decreased after 1998 and the return of devaluations. Since 2002 a more balanced situation 
prevailed with no misalignments in real terms, an undervaluation against the dollar and an 
appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate which reflected improvement in Brazilian 
competitiveness. But things have worsened with the burst of the crisis. Undervaluation against 
the dollar have disappeared and real overvaluation is back, although moderately. 
 
East Asian countries, including Korea, have roughly followed the same path in spite of 
inequality in the level of development: real and, often, nominal depreciation until the end of 
the 1980s, stabilization against the dollar with, in some cases, real appreciation during the 
1990s, large devaluations after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 followed, more or less rapidly, 
by revaluation against the dollar and in real terms. There is no general configuration in terms 
of under or overvaluation for all the East Asian currencies during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Periods of undervaluation and overvaluation have alternatively prevailed. Indonesia occupied 
a specific position due to its statue of oil producer. The Korean won and Thai baht were more 
overvalued before the Asian crisis of 1997. After the huge devaluations of 1997-1998 the real 
undervaluation didn’t last and misalignments remained limited in real terms, but not against 
the dollar. During the 2000s all the East Asian currencies were undervalued against the dollar, 
but less than the yuan and the yen and more than the euro after its revaluation in the second 
half of the 2000s. Since the burst of the financial crisis of 2008, the undervaluation has been 
preserved against the dollar and amplified in real terms with rising current surpluses, above 
their equilibrium values. This configuration, although less marked than in the Chinese case, 
contributes to the persistence of current imbalances. 
 
Latin American countries have known wider and more dispersed misalignments and current 
imbalances, but nominal stabilization has been observed since the 2000s. Argentina 
experimented three contrasted periods. During the 1980s a succession of stabilization plans 
trying to fight inflation led to overvaluation and was followed by policies more turned 
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towards competitiveness, inducing undervaluation, but also high inflation. During the 1990s 
the currency board regime led to huge deficits and overvaluation until the crisis of 2001. After 
the maxi-devaluation, undervaluation against the dollar prevailed, but was less durable in real 
terms. However Argentina faced the world crisis of 2008 in a more comfortable position with 
large surpluses and undervaluation, although the question of the measure of inflation induces 
some incertitude. 
 
In Mexico three periods can also be considered. The first part of the 1980s was marked by 
stabilization plans which failed, but preserved undervaluation and current surpluses. From 
1987 to the crisis of 1995 more heterodox plans, followed by trade liberalization, succeeded 
in stopping inflation, but entailed large overvaluation and current deficits. Since then, 
successive devaluations limited the overvaluation and the imbalances’ amplitude and led to a 
progressive stabilization. In spite of this, facing the crisis of 2008, the room for manoeuvre of 
the Mexican economy, closely connected with the US, seems relatively limited. 
 
Chile, Colombia and Uruguay presents some similarities in their exchange rate evolution, a 
long nominal depreciation up to 2002, a succession of depreciation and appreciation in real 
terms with a much larger amplitude in Uruguay. In Chile, after an overvaluation period during 
the first part of 1980s, a more balanced situation prevailed in spite of the destabilizing effects 
of the Asian crisis of 1997 and of the financial crisis of 2008. On long period imbalances have 
been much larger in Colombia and overvaluation has tended to amplify during the last crisis. 
On the contrary Uruguay has reduced its overvaluation since the middle of the 2000s. 
 
On the whole in 2009, the dollar was still overvalued against all the East Asian currencies, 
except the yen which was close to equilibrium. The undervaluation of the yuan was the largest 
one. The dollar was also overvalued against some Latin American economies (Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay) which benefited of undervalued currencies in real terms. Brazil and 
Mexico had currencies close to equilibrium against the dollar, but were slightly overvalued in 
real terms, which reduced their room for manoeuvre, especially for Mexico. The euro area, as 
a whole, was also close to equilibrium, but faced mainly huge intra-European imbalances. 
Last, Colombia and, above all, India suffered of overvalued currencies against the dollar and 
in real terms. 
 
  
41 
Appendix 1: Multinational model in differential logarithmic
8
 
 
Multinational model in logarithmic differentials (x = dX / X = (X  Xe) / Xe) is transformed 
into: 
 
  i i ij j i i i
j i
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
    [24] 
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  1i i i i ipx x pmx x p     [28] 
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   1
i ii i i petx x i i i i
b T px x pm m         [32] 
 
With wx, wm, vx, vm = the shares of each country in the world exports in volume, the world 
imports in volume, the world exports in value and the world imports in value, respectively; T 
= PXX / PMM = ratio of exportation to importation; μ = PMM/PY = openness ratio; F = net 
external position in dollars; i = interest rates; x = iEF/PXX = ratio of external debt services 
to exports and σpetx = EPpetMpet/PXX, ratio of net oil imports on non-oil exports.  
 
The way the equation [32] is derived should be explained: 
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 (Source: authors’ calculations, CHELEM, 
CEPII’s database). Here, we use natural logarithms in order to simplify calculations. This approximation is 
acceptable at first order and in the vicinity of equilibrium. 
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Appendix 2: National model in differential logarithmic 
 
National model in logarithmic differentials (x = dX / X = (X  Xe) / Xe) is transformed into: 
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We can compute r (equation [20]), the misalignment of “national euro” in real effective terms 
(r = dLogR = dR / R = (R  R*) / R*): 
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By using the equation [18] , we can find out e, the degree of misalignment in bilateral 
nominal terms (equation [21]); the partner countries’ misalignments are given by the previous 
multinational model: 
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Like in the multinational model, we suppose that 
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We can also compute the effective ERM based on consumer prices (PD) (equation [22]): 
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(pdj, ej, pxj obtained thanks to the multinational model) 
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Appendix 3: Trade elasticities 
 
The elasticities of the MIMOSA model for Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom 
(close to those of Wren-Lewis), those of Dées for China and those of Hervé for the Euro area 
are taken for our simulation. The price elasticities are rather in accordance with the generally 
admitted hierarchical position of countries in the world trade. The relatively weak value for 
China could be surprising, but might be explained by the particular nature of the Chinese 
trade. The trade model of China was estimated for the period 1985-1998 and for the first half 
of the 1980s the role of exchange rates in exports and imports is considered as little 
significant. Notice also that Japanese and American exporters turn out to be largely price 
maker. The price elasticities are weaker in the OECD (2005) publication as they concern the 
total trade of goods and services. For the Rest of the World, estimation of elasticities has been 
made using data from CHELEM and OECD. 
 
Country Source x m x m 
Japan 
MIMOSA 
NIGEM 
Wren-Lewis 
OECD 
1.26 
1.19 
1.36 
1.05 
1.47 
0.61 
1.16 
0.40 
1.01 
1.00 
0.91 
1.00 
1.50 
1.69 
1.20 
1.00 
China 
Dées 
Brillet 
OECD 
0.71 
0.66 
1.50 
1.02 
0.46 
 0.50
*
 
0.75 
1.00 
1.00 
1.04 
0.98 
 1.57
*
 
U.S. 
MIMOSA 
NIGEM 
Wren-Lewis 
OECD 
0.91 
0.52 
0.96 
0.60 
1.44 
0.61 
1.35 
0.33 
1.04 
1.00 
1.12 
1.00 
1.56 
2.52 
2.00 
1.00 
U.K. 
MIMOSA 
Wren-Lewis 
OECD 
0.70 
1.26 
0.60 
1.33 
0.22 
0.28 
0.87 
0.91 
1.00 
1.82 
2.00 
1.00 
Euro area 
ECB 
Hervé 
0.50 
1.39 
0.81 
0.30 
1.00 
1.05 
   0.51
**
 
1.06 
RoW 
Ad hoc 
Our estimates 
1.00 
0.58 
1.00 
1.66 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.35 
(*Kwack et alii (2007), ** Non-oil import in volume) 
 
For emerging countries, studies of Senhadji (1998), Senhadji & Montenegro  (1999), Barrel et 
al., (1999), Ito et al. (1996) and of IMF (2000) have been used. For Korea and Thailand 
Barell’s results, close to those of Senhadji, have been taken whereas for Indonesia FMI’s 
elasticities have appeared more significant. For India Senhadji’s results have been used. Two 
problems appeared for Malaysia and Philippines. Import price elasticity of Malaysia estimated 
by IMF seemed too weak while Philippines’ one estimated by Senhadji was very high, 
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especially compared with IMF results. For these two countries, mean values obtained for the 
whole set of Senhadji’s emerging countries have been preferred for import price and income 
elasticities (εm = 1.4; ηm = 1.1). Last, for Uruguay also, the import income elasticity 
appeared too high and a smaller value (1.5) has been used.  
 
Country Source x m x m 
Korea 
Barell 
Kim 
2.20 
1.11 
1.20 
0.10 
2.00 
1.29 
1.20 
1.59 
India Senhadji 0.77 1.12 1.55 1.33 
Indonesia 
IMF 
Senhadji 
0.32 
- 
0.68 
1.51 
1.27 
- 
1.66 
0.98 
Malaysia IMF 0.53 0.01 1.86 1.47 
Philippines 
IMF 
Senhadji 
-0.10 
1.22 
-0.75 
2.73 
1.34 
1.19 
1.65 
2.26 
Thailand 
IMF 
Barell 
Senhadji 
0.99 
0.45 
- 
0.75 
0.93 
1.37 
2.73 
2.59 
- 
1.03 
1.59 
1.69 
Argentina Senhadji 0.24 1.07 1.28 1.27 
Brazil Senhadji 1.60 1.81 2.10 1.25 
Chile 
Ito et al. 
Senhadji 
0.10 
0.10 
0.23 
0.02 
2.87 
2.87 
1.70 
1.70 
Colombia Senhadji 1.73 0.78 1.39 1.09 
Mexico 
Senhadji 
Ito et al. 
- 
0.77 
0.79 
1.43 
- 
1.55 
1.32 
1.60 
Uruguay Senhadji 1.77 0.94 0.59 5.54 
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Appendix 4: Sensitivity tests 
 
Considering the existing uncertainties in the estimation of external and internal equilibrium 
and in the measure of trade elasticities, three kinds of sensibility tests have been performed: 
 
 an increase of the target current balance of 1% of GDP (bc); 
 an increase of the potential production of 1% (ye); 
 an increase of the export price elasticity of 20% (εx); 
 an increase of the import price elasticity of 20% (εm). 
 
Table 8: Sensitivity tests on real effective exchange rates (rc) 
 
 
bc y
e
 εx εm 
Korea 0.0066 0.0022 0.0014 0.0029 
India 0.0542 0.0021 0.0004 0.0070 
Indonesia 0.0140 0.0143 0.0146 0.0152 
Malaysia 0.0030 0.0157 0.0162 0.0126 
Philippines 0.0127 0.0052 0.0053 0.0063 
Thailand 0.0120 0.0045 0.0043 0.0064 
Argentina 0.0492 0.0169 0.0171 0.0203 
Brazil 0.0365 0.0062 0.0060 0.0150 
Chile 0.0202 0.0037 0.0001 0.0065 
Colombia 0.0468 0.0100 0.0042 0.0110 
Mexico 0.0113 0.0106 0.0046 0.0063 
Uruguay 0.0209 0.0206 0.0072 0.0092 
(Source: authors’ calculations, absolute average of changes from the base simulation results) 
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Appendix 5: Sources 
 
Variable Source 
CAS World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2009 
ISNFA P.R. Lane and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti’s Database, 2007 
CDR, ODR World population prospect, ONU, Last update, September 28, 2007 
OG Economic Outlook, OECD, December 2008 
OB CHELEM, CEPII’s Database, 2009 
 
Appendix 6: Panel unit root test 
 
Variables CA ISNFA CDR ODR DR OG OB 
Developed countries group -2.16** -1.20*** -3.83*** -11.29*** - -7.65*** - 
Emerging countries group -3.32*** -2.23** - - -2.48*** -8.20*** -4.08*** 
(Source: authors' calculation) 
(*** = Significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5% using the test statistic Im Pesaran Shin; the rejection of the null 
hypothesis (of the presence of unit root), leads us to reject non-stationarity of the series.) 
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Appendix 7: Comparison with Cline’s OCI estimates 
 
In spite of some differences in the methodology, a comparison with Cline’s estimates is 
possible. If, in both cases, the FEER framework is used, Cline’s model has 35 countries, a 
simpler analysis of the foreign trade for each country and no structural approach of the current 
account equilibrium. Instead, it is simply supposed that external imbalances should not exceed 
3% of GDP (in absolute value) in the medium term, which allows building a scenario of 
current account targets for the 30 non-oil exporting countries. 
 
Table 9: Comparison with Cline’s estimates (in %) 
 
 
Real Effective Nominal Bilateral 
 
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
 
Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline 
USA -23.6 -7.8 -9.9 -5.7 -11.0 -7.8 - - - - - - 
UK -0.6 -4.2 -4.1 -6.3 -5.0 -1.4 13.3 1.0 4.4 2.5 4.5 4.5 
EU -4.5 -4.3 -2.0 -2.5 -1.0 -2.5 11.8 2.7 7.2 7.2 8.8 4.6 
CHN 16.2 12.6 10.8 29.6 11.4 13.5 34.5 23.4 22.4 40.7 23.8 24.2 
IND -17.2 -2.1 -12.9 -12.0 -14.6 -1.8 -0.9 7.3 -3.8 -1.5 -4.6 7.7 
BRA -8.4 -0.4 -5.1 -27.8 -17.6 -5.9 8.3 5.8 5.0 -15.4 -7.5 0.0 
JPN 5.2 4.2 -5.1 -0.2 -3.8 -2.0 22.0 15.1 6.4 16.1 8.2 8.8 
KOR -2.4 -2.0 5.8 -16.5 -0.6 -1.8 16.5 10.0 19.5 -3.0 11.3 9.5 
INS 4.9 2.7 12.2 -16.4 12.8 -2.0 25.8 17.8 25.7 -5.0 26.7 14.6 
MYS 4.4 8.5 3.5 19.3 2.0 12.5 34.5 23.1 20.2 30.5 16.6 29.0 
PHI 2.6 1.5 9.8 2.8 5.2 -1.7 23.8 14.6 25.0 14.8 19.0 11.8 
THA 1.5 1.7 10.5 -0.1 2.8 -2.0 24.8 14.6 28.8 12.4 16.4 10.8 
ARG 11.4 -2.0 11.9 14.5 7.2 -2.9 31.4 4.5 24.2 16.9 19.4 1.8 
CHI 0.2 -0.3 12.0 -10.9 0.7 -2.6 18.0 6.4 25.5 -6.2 12.0 3.3 
COL -17.9 -4.8 -5.2 -0.6 -33.0 -2.3 -3.5 -0.4 4.5 10.8 -26.3 1.5 
MEX -8.2 -0.1 -1.2 -9.2 -5.5 -0.8 21.1 2.1 8.8 -8.6 3.9 1.3 
(Source: Cline, 2008; Cline & Williamson, 2008, 2009, 2010; authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
(A positive number indicates an undervaluation. Conversely, a negative number indicates an overvaluation) 
 
Our results are close to those of Cline, in real effective terms, with some divergence regarding 
the dollar, in 2008, which can be understood (table 4). In both cases the overvaluation of the 
euro in real effective terms remained small in 2008 and 2009, which can be explained by a 
limited current account deficit, close to its equilibrium value. For the dollar results are more 
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divergent, which has an incidence on all the estimated nominal bilateral misalignments 
against the dollar. The discrepancy in 2008 with Cline’s results for the real effective 
misalignment of the dollar is mainly explained by differences in the US current account 
target. In a previous estimation for 2008, we had a target close to -3% of GDP (as in Cline’s 
work) and results gave a more limited overvaluation of -11.1 % for the dollar in 2008. 
However, the actual estimation with an overvaluation of -24% seems plausible as the US 
current deficit was still -5% of GDP in 2008. For 2009, the results are very close in a previous 
work Cline & Williamson (2009) found that the dollar is overvalued by 17.7 % in real terms 
in 2009 but this estimation was made with the value of the exchange rate in March 2009 when 
the dollar appreciation was the highest after the financial meltdown in October 2008. 
 
From March to November, the dollar depreciated by 12 % consecutively to the return of risk 
appetite of investors. This movement marked the end of the safe haven effect caused by the 
crisis. This depreciation of the dollar reduced the real effective overvaluation (Cline & 
Williamson, 2010). 
 
For emerging countries, the results are globally convergent, on the whole period, with some 
exceptions which can be explained by differences in the current account targets. For example, 
our estimates give more overvalued currencies for India and Colombia relatively to those of 
Cline. For these two countries, Cline uses a target of -3 % of GDP. Conversely, our 
econometric estimates yield a target of -1 % which produces more overvalued currencies 
since the current account target is relatively higher. 
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Appendix 8: Correlation between real effective exchange rate and current account 
 
 
(For industrialized countries, the subsamples are: before 2002 for the U.S., after 1984 for Japan, after 
1990 for the U.K, after 1997 for the Euro area, after 1996 for China) 
 
For industrialized countries, we choose to calculate the linear correlation between the real 
effective exchange rate in t and the current account in t + 2 because of some inertia in the 
current account of these countries (excepted for Japan and China in which the current seems 
to react faster to the real effective exchange rate, we calculate the linear correlation between 
the real effective exchange rate in t and the current account in t + 1). For emerging countries, 
we calculate the linear correlation between the real effective exchange rate in t and the current 
account in t because of a weaker inertia. 
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